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Abstract
This paper highlights the eﬀect of the presence of the goverment and its redistri-
bution policy in the technology adoption decision. As a result it helps explain the
diﬀerences in skill premium patterns across the North Atlantic between developed
economies such as the US and Continental Europe.
1. Introduction
When comparing the performance between the US and Continental Europe in terms of
skill premium, Acemoglu (2003) argues that three mechanisms are responsible for the
diﬀerences in technology adoption and skill premium across the North Atlantic.
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comments. All errors are, of course, mine• First he argues that the supply of skilled workers has behaved diﬀerently in Europe
vs.. the US. The relative supply of skilled workers has increased faster in Europe
than in the US.
• Second, the institutions in Europe compress the skill premium. The wage setting
environment in Europe is much more concerned with inequality than that of the
US, and therefore diﬀerences in the performances in terms of skill premium are
inﬂuenced by the diﬀerences in institutions.
• Finally, the demand also behaved diﬀerently, being the demand for skilled workers
i nt h eU Sm u c hs t r o n g e rt h a nt h a to fE u r o p e .
Acemoglu (2003) proposes a model where ﬁrms choose diﬀerent technologies given
the labor market conditions and ﬁnds that it helps explain the diﬀerences across the
N o r t hA t l a n t i cO c e a n . I np a r t i c u l a rh ea r g u e st h a tt h et h i r dr e a s o ns t a t e da b o v e
plays an important role in accounting the diﬀerences for these countries. On the other
hand, in a somewhat related article, Prescott (2004), argues that diﬀerences in the labor
supply between Continental Europe and the US are mostly related to diﬀerences in tax
rates.
Moscoso Boedo (2006) develops a general equilibrium dynamic model that incor-
porates the ﬁrst and third arguments stated above. In that work I ﬁnd that the skill
premium by 1990 in the 1st decile of the distribution for GDP per worker is lower than
that of the US, and that is entirely explained by the diﬀerences in the paths of T.F.P.
The US experienced a much faster growth in T.F.P and therefore a abrupt adoption of
technologies intensive in skilled workers. This steeper transition generated an evolution
2of skill premium in the US that is above its counterpart in Europe.1
In this paper, I incorporate a government to the model. In the case of the OECD
countries we have access to the OECD Tax Database with data for tax rates for the
diﬀerent levels of wage rates together with the levels of capital taxation, which, in
general, it is not available for a large number of countries.
The focus of this paper is to understand the diﬀerences across OECD countries in a
framework where the three elements outlined by Acemoglu (2003) are relevant. That is,
skills are created and supplied to the market, skills are demanded by ﬁrms that have a
technological decision and where the government taxes diﬀerently across income levels.
The main mechanism in the model will be the following: conditional on diﬀerent tax
rates for skilled and unskilled workers, the households will supply diﬀerent stocks of
skilled and unskilled workers together with physical capital. On the ﬁrms side, they
will adopt diﬀerent technologies that vary in terms of the skill intensity. The focus will
be on the eﬀects of the government taxation and transfers on the production of skills
and adoption of diﬀerent technologies. Basically, the eﬀect of government policies can
be divided in two: ﬁrst, the diﬀerent tax rates aﬀect the returns to skills and therefore
act as incentives or disincentives to the creation of skills, and second, the transfers that
the households receive from the government act as endowment, inﬂuencing the skill
creation.
In addition to the international comparison in steady state, the introduction of taxes
to the model enables me to run policy experiments. Basically, I will simulate the eﬀects
1In Moscoso Boedo (2005), there are two aspects of the model that may not be suitable for the
analysis of developed countries analysis. First, the deﬁnition of skilled worker. There the deﬁnition is
that of a worker with primary schooling. For a comprehensive cross country analysis I was "forced" to
pick that deﬁnition because on the lower end of the output per worker spectrum, countries would have
gotten a very low level of supply of skilled workers. But for the analysis of developed countries it seems
much more appropriate to denote skilled workers to those with more than secondary school complete.
3of taxes similar to those observed in the US since 2001 and evaluate what the model
predicts.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 a theoretical model is presented.
There I use the basic model presented by Moscoso Boedo (2006) in its decentralized
version with the inclusion of a very simple government that taxes diﬀerently the various
sources of income. Section 3 presents the data used to calibrate and evaluate the
model, section 4 explains the calibration procedure and section 5 uses the model to
investigate the eﬀects of taxes in the behavior of skill premium and technology choices
across countries. Section 6 investigates the dynamic eﬀects of changes in the tax code
as those introduced in the US in 2001. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2. Model
T h i sw i l lb eb a s e do nM o s c o s oB o e d o( 2 0 0 6 ) ,w i t ht h ei n t r o d u c t i o no ft h eg o v e r n m e n t .
Where the production technology is an endogenous choice subject to accelerated obso-
lescence in the case of a technology change.
Households
A set of atomistic representative households own capital and labor. They rent
capital, skilled labor and unskilled labor to the ﬁrm every period The capital and
skilled labor they own is of type b and can only be used in production in a type b ﬁrm.
They make investment and education decisions. Education is undertaken internally in
the household2. That means that the household decides how much capital, skilled labor
and unskilled labor supply to the market given prices, and the part of capital, skilled
labor and unskilled labor that is not supplied is used to produce more skilled labor for
2This is not a key issue. Households could buy H() in the market since it is a constant returns to
scale technology the results would not change.
4next period. Every period the type of the physical capital and skills the household
owns is given but can be changed for the future, so the household not only chooses the
evolution of the quantity of physical capital and skilled labor but also its type for the
future.
So, the problem of the representative consumer can be written as follows
max





Ct + It ≤ (1 − τst)wsbtSpt (bt)+( 1− τut)wubtUpt +( 1− τkt)rbtKp (bt)
+Trt
St (bt) ≥ Spt (bt)+Set (bt)
Upt + Uet ≤ 1 − St(bt)
Kt (bt) ≥ Kpt (bt)+Ket (bt)
St+1 (bt+1) ≤ St [1 − δs − G(bt,b t+1)] + H (Ket (bt),S et (bt),U et)
Kt+1 (bt+1) ≤ Kt [1 − δk − G(bt,b t+1)] + It
Where Ct, It denote consumption and investment in period t respectively. Spt, Upt
and Kpt denote skilled workers, unskilled workers and capital devoted to ﬁnal production
and Set, Uet and Ket denote skilled workers, unskilled workers and capital into education.
bt indexes the technology active in the ﬁn a lp r o d u c t i o ns e c t o ri np e r i o dt. wsbt,w ubt
and rbt stand for wages for skilled workers, unskilled workers and interest rate in period
5t under technology b. Taxes are denoted by τst,τut and τkt where subscript s denotes
taxes on skilled workers, u taxes on unskilled workers and k taxes on capital income.
The household will also be entitled to a transfer by the government which will be taken
as given and is denoted by Trt.
Finally we have two functions that will be discussed in more detail below, but
G(bt,b t+1) is used to express the accelerated obsolescence of skills and physical capital
as a result of a technology change, and the function H (Ket (bt),S et (bt),U et) is the
education function, that is, the function that is used to create skills.
Note that the household supplies to the market only one type of both skills and
physical capital and the household pays the price in terms of obsolescence when choosing
what type to supply.
Firms
Final goods producing ﬁrms can be ordered according what technology they operate,
by the parameter b. Firms operate for one period, that is they have a static problem.
They rent unskilled labor, skilled labor and capital of type b from the household in
order to maximize proﬁts. In other words in every period there is demand for unskilled
labor, skilled labor and capital of every type b, 0 <b<1. The market under which
ﬁrms operate is perfectly competitive. So problem each ﬁrm of type b solves is:
max
Spt (b),U pt,K pt (b)
ptF (b,Kpt (b),S pt (b),U pt)
−wst (b)Spt (b) − wut (b)Upt − rt (b)Kpt (b)
6So the optimal conditions for each type b ﬁrm are:
wst (b)
pt
= FSp (b,Kpt (b),S pt (b),U pt) (2.2)
wut (b)
pt
= FUp (b,Kpt (b),S pt (b),U pt)
rt (b)
pt
= FKp (b,Kpt (b),S pt (b),U pt)
Where wst (b) stands for wages for skilled workers oﬀered by a ﬁrm operating tech-
nology b in period t, wut (b) stands for wages for unskilled workers oﬀered by a ﬁrm
operating technology b in period t and rt (b) represents the interest rate oﬀered by ﬁrms
operating technology b in period t.A n d pt stands for the price of ﬁnal goods, which is
normalized to 1. So, for every b-type ﬁrm, their maximizing behavior determines wages
and interest rate under each technology. Therefore at every moment in time we have a
function of wages and interest rate as function of the parameter b.
Note that ﬁrms in the model play a very uninteresting role. They can also be inter-
preted as freely choosing the any production parameter b ∈ [0,1], where it is necessary
to hire Kp and Sp of that type in order to produce ﬁnal goods.
Government
The government will have a very passive role in the model. It will only collect taxes
and redistribute income through transfers. The government will run a balanced budget
every period therefore the budget constraint of the government given by:
τstwsbtSpt (bt)+τutwubtUpt + τktrbtKp (bt)=Trt
7Equilibrium











t=0,s u c ht h a t :
1.- Households maximize utility. That is they solve the problem deﬁned by equation
(2.1).
2.- Firms maximize proﬁts. That is, for every technology parameter, equations (2.2)
are satisﬁed.
3.- Initial conditions. That is b0,S 0, and K0,a r eg i v e n .
4.- Feasibility: Ct + It ≤ F (Spt,U pt,K pt,b t) ; 0 ≤ bt ≤ 1 ; 0 ≤ Spt + Set ≤ 1
5.- Balanced budget of the government: τstwsbtSpt (bt)+τutwubtUpt
+τktrbtKp (bt)=Trt
Since household are identical they all make the same decision, so only one type of
skills and physical capital is supplied in the market, therefore only one ﬁrm actually
operates in the market.








2 in Moscoso Boedo (2006), where it explains how those functions behave for technology
parameters that are not observed in equilibrium.
Functional forms
Following Moscoso Boedo (2006) I keep with my choices of functional forms for
the utility function, production function, the educational function and the technology
change cost function. The model stated above requires the choice of functional forms
for the functions u(), F(), G(),a n dH().














This function satisﬁes the requirements stated above, G(bt,b t)=0and
G(bt,b t+1) > 0 for bt 6= bt+1.
Note that the function G(bt,b t+1) is convex, which is in line with a whole literature
of convex adjustment cost, which induce the planner or the market to take small steps
in adjusting the technology instead of taking big jumps. Also note that the function
G(bt,b t+1) has the property that its derivatives in steady state are equal to zero. The
function G(bt,b t+1) is aﬀected by only one parameter, ζ.A s ζ increases the costs
associated with technological change (in terms of skilled workers and physical capital),
increase, aﬀecting the dynamic transition oﬀ the model (while not in steady state).
The choice of the production function of ﬁnal goods, F(), is not straightforward.
Since one of the features I want the model to capture is the evolution of the skill
premium, it should be the case that skilled and unskilled labor are imperfect substitutes.
Therefore I restrict the attention to the family of nested CES functions, with inputs
Kp,S p and Up.L e t Ω(At,B t;a, ) be a CES function between inputs At and Bt with
weights parameter a and elasticity parameter  . The technological choice of interest
9is constrained to the skill biased parameter, which I will call b for "bias". Therefore I
restrict the attention to the CES weights between terms containing skilled workers and
unskilled workers3. Then the possible nested CES forms are:
• F1 = Ω(Ω(Ut,S t;b,ρ 1),K t;a,ρ2)
• F2 = Ω(Ω(St,K t;a,ρ1),U t;b,ρ 2)
• F3 = Ω(Ω(Ut,K t;a,ρ1),S t;b,ρ 2)
F1 is the production function of choice in both Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998)
and Caselli and Coleman (2005). The problem with this functional form is given by
the fact that in steady state Fb (b,Kp,S p,U p)=0which requires that U = ιS, where ι
denotes some constant, independent of the level of T.F.P. The condition of U = ιS is
a direct consequence of the linearity of the CES function with respect to b.
F2 is the production function used by Krusell et. al. (2000). They argue in
favor of F2 instead of F3 because data collected by Hamermesh (1993) suggest that the
elasticity of substitution between S and U is higher than that between S and K, and
function F3 restrict them to be equal. This feature in the data comes from estimates
of the partial elasticity of substitution, which depends on the levels of S, U and K,
and not only on the substitution parameter. As I show later, the partial elasticity of
substitution in speciﬁcation F3 b e t w e e nSa n dUi sh i g h e rt h a nt h a tb e t w e e nSa n dK .
The problem with speciﬁcation F2 is that under the parameters suggested by Krusell
et. al. (2000), the endogenous technological change goes towards higher intensities in
the use of unskilled labor. One alternative would be to use F2 under a diﬀerent set of
3Even though it is conceivable that one could make the choice of technologies be that of choosing all
the parameters in the production function (ρ1,ρ 2,a,b), I restrict the attention to only b.
10parameters, but that would violate the moments estimated by Krusell et. al. (2000), in
particular the elasticities of substitution between capital, skilled workers and unskilled
workers. That is why I choose form F3 as the production function in the paper4.
To summarize the production function used in the quantitative exercise is given by















Finally the function H() is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas:




The speciﬁcation of the law of motion for the stock of skilled workers does not
restrict St to be less than 1, in the case of high enough Ke. Even though this is
possible, the planner never chooses an St > 1 because the productivity of the unskilled
workers approaches inﬁnity as Ut approaches zero.
3. Data
Data to calibrate and evaluate the model come from various sources.
Data on skilled workers is taken from Barro Lee (2000). A major diﬀerence with
respect to Moscoso Boedo (2006) and Caselli and Coleman (2005) is the deﬁnition
of skilled worker. In those papers skilled worker was deﬁned as those with primary
4F
3 is also the production function of choice in Funk and Vogel (2004).
Under the set of parameters chosen in table 1,t h ef o r mF
3 does match the elasticities of substitution
estimated by Hamermesh (1993), which were close to the ones estimated by Krusell et. al. (2000)
11schooling or more. In the OECD context, that deﬁnition seems not to be the best
to capture diﬀerences in human capital, therefore I deﬁne skilled worker as a college
graduate.
Output per capita is obtained from Heston, Summers and Aten (2002).
Finally tax rates are obtained from the OECD Tax Database. Tax rates for diﬀerent
levels of wages can be obtained for the years from 2000 to 2005. The database reports
taxes paid by the individuals earning 67%, 100% and 167% of the mean wage. In order
to construct the tax schedule for a country, I generate a linear tax schedule taking the
tax rates paid by the individuals at the 67% and 167% of the mean, call them τ67 and
τ167. Therefore, if in the model the unskilled worker and skilled worker are in the 50%
and 150% of the mean income, they will be faced with the tax rate determined by the
linear relation generated by the 67% and 167%. The tax rate on capital income is
also obtained from the OECD tax Database. The actual data used in the model to
construct the tax schedule for each country is shown in the appendix. An example of
the linear interpolation of the tax rate is given by Figure 3.1. In the example, if the
wage rate for unskilled workers wu equals 50% of the mean wage, the linear tax schedule
determines the tax rate τu,a n dw i t ht h es a m er e a s o n i n gi fws equals 150% of the mean
wage, the linear tax schedule determines τs.
Therefore, once the model is calibrated, each country consists of a vector containing
τ67,τ 167,τ k, and z (the level of total factor productivity such as the model matches
t h el e v e lo fo u t p u tp e rw o r k e ri ne a c hc o u n t r y ) .





























Figure 3.1: Tax rate generated by τ67 and τ167 obtained from the OECD tax database.
4. Calibration
I calibrate the model to a steady state in the US around 2000, which uses the US tax
schedule for 2000. Therefore I have one less parameter in steady state, namely ζ.T h e
m a t c hb e t w e e nt h em o d e la n dt h ed a t ai ss h o w ni nt a b l e2a n dt h ep a r a m e t e r st h a t
implement that match are shown in table 1. Some parameters are set according to the
existing literature. For instance δk = .08 , β = .96, ϕ =2and following Manuelli and
Seshadri (2005) δs = .02.
Table 1: Parameter values in the model
Parameter zρ 1 ρ2 aµ ξ ψ
Value .3 .5 −0.2 .3 .6 .1759 .18
13Table 2: Comparison between the model and the data in 2000
Moment Model Data US, 2000
Skill Premium 1.67 1.675
Skilled workers .28 .286
Consumption Output Ratio .85 .817
Students over Labor Force .072 .0948
Expenditure per pupil over GDP per worker .21 .249
Capital Share of GDP .33 .3
Wage expenditure in education .7036 .703610
5. Cross section steady state analysis
As in Moscoso Boedo (2006), the steady state analysis consist of changing the parameter
z (T.F.P) so as to match the level of output per worker shown in the appendix for the
countries in the OECD database. Each country is deﬁned not only by a diﬀerent level
of total factor productivity but also by an individual vector of tax rates on wages and
capital income as shown in the appendix
.
5Using the Statistical abstract of the US for educational attainment of the population and the returns
to school reported by Goldin and Katz (1999) for the year 1995, generate a wage rate per educational
level as exp(γn)w h e r eγ is the return to one year of school and n is the years of schooling per educational
level, and then average them weighing by the number of people in each level
6From the US census, equal to people with college completed or more
7This is the ratio of Personal Consumption Expenditures to Personal income reported by the Bureau
of Economic Analysis, in its table 2.1 for the year 2000
8Calculated as the ratio of students enrolled in college times the participation rate over the total
labor force. Source: Statistical Abstract of The US for 2003 (data taken for 2000).
9Obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the US 1990
10Obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the US for 1990. Same number as in Moscoso Boedo
(2006)



























































Figure 5.1: TotalSkil lpremium =
(1−τs)ws+Tr
(1−τu)wu+Tr in the model
Figure 5.1 depicts the relation between total skill premium and output per capita,
where skill premium is now deﬁned as follows:
TotalSkil lpremium =
(1 − τs)ws + Tr
(1 − τu)wu + Tr
Other measurements related to skill premium are the ratio of pre tax and after tax
wages, which are depicted in the next two ﬁgures.
The last 3 ﬁgures show that only when including taxes and transfers the model is















































Figure 5.2: pre tax wage ratio in the model
able to replicate the relationship in terms of skill premium observed in the data, where
continental Europe has a considerable lower skill premium than the US. Pre and after
tax wage measurements of skill premium even go in the wrong direction when comparing
continental Europe to the US.
If we compare the predictions of the model with the estimations by Acemoglu (2003),
the skill premium concept that has potential of matching the data is the total skill
premium. That is, once we include both taxes and transfers to determine the disposable
income across the wage spectrum. The comparison between the data and model in terms
of skill premium is shown in Figure 5.4.



















































Figure 5.3: After tax ratio between wages of skilled to unskilled workers in the model
Figure 5.4 shows that the model overestimates systematically the skill premium
when compared to the data, even though qualitatively it generates on average a lower
skill premium for most of the European countries (relative to the US).
As Figure 5.5 shows, the eﬀects of redistribution through the tax system generate
diﬀerent responses in terms of technology parameters in steady state. Keep in mind
that a lower value of b indicates the choice of a production function relatively intensive
in the use of the skilled labor input. Without taxes the model generated a perfectly
monotonically increasing function of skill intensity (1−b) to GDP per worker, but with
the introduction of taxes there are some countries that in equilibrium use a relatively











































Figure 5.4: Comparison between the skill premium reported by Acemoglu (2003), table
1b, and the total skill premium predicted by the model
skill intensive technology that are not in the frontier of output per capita. Now the
model predicts that those countries that constituted a cluster of lower skill premium also
use technologies more intensive in the use of skilled workers. Therefore, the introduction
of taxes, generated a cluster constituted mainly with the continental European countries
that have a lower skill premium compared to the US, lower level of TFP (to generate
their lower GDP per worker), together with skill intensive technologies (compared to
the US).
In terms of the stock of skilled workers, the comparison between the data and the
model is given by Figure 5.6


























































Figure 5.5: Technology parameter b predicted by the model
In every case the model predicts a higher stock of skilled workers than that ob-
served by Barro and Lee (2000). Even though the relationship in the model and the
data between skilled workers and GDP per capita is in both cases a positive one, the
correlation coeﬃcient between the data and the model is .13. This bias in terms of
skilled workers also appears in Moscoso Boedo (2006), and is due to the fact that the
US can be though of as an outlier and the model is calibrated to match the moments
in the US economy. It is important to keep in mind that even though some European
countries have "weaker" incentives than the US for the creation of skilled workers (lower
skill premium), they have larger transfers, which makes the creation of skilled workers























































As it can be observed from this exercise, once a skill creation decision dimension
is introduced, diﬀerences in tax rates are not enough to account for the diﬀerences
observed in terms of the stocks of skilled workers between the US and Europe, and also
predict much smaller diﬀerences in terms of skill premium. Tax rates diﬀerences were
enough to induce the observed variation in hours worked across the North Atlantic as
pointed out by Prescott (2004), once a model with leisure in the utility function is set
up. The model presented in this paper tries to capture other labor market dimensions,
such as skill creation and skill premium, and in the model of technological adoption the
20diﬀerences in tax rates are not enough to induce the observed patterns between the US
and Europe.
6. US tax cut of 2001
In 2001 the tax rates were lowered diﬀerently across the spectrum of income. The new
tax law is eﬀective until the end of 2010. In order to capture the changes of the tax
code I take the tax rates for the US in 2000 and 2005 for the 67% and 167% levels of the
GDP per worker to construct the linear relation between tax rate and income level, as
well as for the capital income in both years from the OECD tax database, as shown in
Figure 3.1. The idea of the whole experiment is to analyze the eﬀects of the movement





The experiment will be two fold. First I will run it as if the tax change was
permanent, and then as if it was temporary and lasted what the law says (10y e a r s ) .
T h er e s u l t sa r er e p o r t e di nF i g u r e6 . 1
Comparing both experiments there seems to be no important diﬀerences in terms
of the initial reaction of the economy to the new tax code. In both cases the evolution
o fG D Pp e rw o r k e ra n dt h es t o c k so fs k i l l e dw o r k e r sb e h a v ea sam i r r o ro fe a c ho t h e r .
Basically taking resources initially out of the educational sector. In terms of output, the
lower taxes in general induce an increase of around 1%o fG D Pf o rt h ep e r m a n e n tc a s e
and 0.5% of GDP in the temporary one, with initial responses in terms of technology










Permament tax code change










































Temporary tax code change












Figure 6.1: Main macro variables predicted by the model
towards unskilled intensive technologies, but very limited. That drive towards a less
skill intensity, generates a loss in the stock of skilled workers. As expected, in the
temporary experiment, no technological change takes place, and that is entirely driven
by the cost of technical change which penalizes changes in both directions of the skill
bias parameter. In the permanent case, there is a drive towards less skill intensive
technologies generated by the tax changes. This also generates decreases in the stocks
of skilled workers, which are demanded less intensively under the new tax environment.
227. Conclusion
The introduction of the government to the model presented by Moscoso Boedo (2006)
seems to incorporate a feature seen in the data, namely that the European countries
display lower levels of inequality together with lower output per worker, while main-
taining the general conclusion that skill premium and level of output per worker are
negatively correlated as seen in the data. It also points out the eﬀect of the redistribu-
tion mechanism on the choice of technology, indicating that some countries may choose
technologies that are more intensive in the use of the skilled labor input than that would
be optimally desirable given the level of development.
Unfortunately quantitatively it is far from generating a successful explanation of the
diﬀerences in terms of skill premium and stocks of skilled workers. Tax rate diﬀerences
are enough to explain diﬀerences in hours worked, but in a model of technological
adoption, once other labor market dimensions are analyzed, variation in tax rates, do
not seem to help explain the variation in skill premium and skilled workers.
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26Country τ67 τ167 τk SY
Turkey 0.39 0.35 0.33 0.048 0.24
Mexico 0.100 . 2 20 . 3 40 . 0 6 60 . 3 8
H u n g a r y0 . 5 00 . 5 80 . 180 . 1160 . 3 9
Korea, Republic of 0.150 . 2 1 0.30 0.191 0.57
Greece 0.34 0.41 0.35 0.131 0.55
Portugal 0.30 0.39 0.33 0.06 0.54
Spain 0.33 0.41 0.35 0.092 0.68
New Zealand 0.190 . 2 50 . 3 3 0 . 160 . 6 1
Italy 0.43 0.51 0.34 0.083 0.84
France 0.40 0.51 0.35 0.094 0.76
G e r m a n y0 . 4 70 . 5 70 . 4 0 0 . 11 0.72
United Kingdom 0.25 0.33 0.30 0.108 0.69
F i n l a n d0 . 4 30 . 5 30 . 2 90 . 134 0.76
Sweden 0.48 0.54 0.28 0.131 0.70
A u s t r i a0 . 4 00 . 5 00 . 3 40 . 0 8 60 . 7 8
Belgium 0.50 0.62 0.34 0.160 . 8 8
Netherlands 0.41 0.44 0.35 0.125 0.81
J a p a n0 . 2 30 . 2 70 . 4 1 0.150 . 6 0
Iceland 0.21 0.38 0.18 0.088 0.70
Australia 0.190 . 3 00 . 3 00 . 169 0.80
Ireland 0.180 . 3 90 . 130 . 11 1.01
Switzerland 0.27 0.34 0.24 0.091 0.73
Denmark 0.41 0.52 0.30 0.122 0.79
Canada 0.27 0.34 0.37 0.143 0.81
Norway 0.34 0.44 0.28 0.11 0.84
U S A0 . 2 90 . 3 70 . 3 90 . 3 0 31.00
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